Volume 5, Issue No. 1
The notion of responsibility is at the heart of not only the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, but also of international criminal justice and responses to mass atrocities more broadly. The global pandemic the world currently faces forces us to rethink how we conceive of responsibility today, and the implications for the international community’s ability to respond to mass atrocities. This is all the more crucial as we ponder on the fifteen years anniversary of the World Summit Outcome Document establishing the R2P doctrine we continue to refer to today. We discussed these subjects with the UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, Dr. Karen Smith, in an interview with which we are opening this issue.
As Anne Orford (2011, p. 26) puts it, “the vocabulary of ‘responsibility’ works . . . as a language for conferring authority and allocating power”. For the R2P, this raises questions about whose responsibility (the state, the international community), for whom (individuals, communities), under what conditions (manifest failures to protect), and by what means (assistance, intervention). How we conceive of, assign, and consequently act on responsibility has important implications for the kind of action it enables on the local, national and global scale.
The R2P, a key focus of the Journal since its inception and the topic of many of the articles in this issue, can be understood through the lens of moral and normative responsibility. In general, moral responsibilities may be attributed to individuals and collectives (Alweiss, 2003, p. 311). This includes formal collective bodies with decision-making structures, based on the argument that the capacity to make moral deliberations (as a decision-making body has) means that corresponding duties can be assigned to it (Erskine, 2008, pp. 700-701). This notion of collective moral responsibility can arguably be seen to underpin pillar two and three of the R2P, embodied in the call for the international community to take action in Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document.
Crucially, the notion of moral responsibility demands that actors are kept answerable to prevailing social norms and moral imperatives (Erskine, 2008, p. 700; Bukovansky et al., 2012, p. 56), which include norms regarding human protection. The R2P has actively sought to reconcile the “two fundamental principles of the UN Charter that [have] all too often worked to opposite ends: state sovereignty and the protection of fundamental human rights” (Bellamy, 2014, p. 5). The inherent contradictory potential present in the normative commitment to humanitarian protection on the one hand, and sovereignty and non-interference on the other, is addressed in contributions to this issue: Diletta Alparone (2020) demonstrates how national interests have prevented effective action regarding the ongoing genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar, while Macaulay Eddy (2020) assesses the extent to which the doctrine is compatible with the priorities of counterterrorism. The antagonism between the two principles which the R2P attempts to reconcile, and the tendency of states to act in their self-interest, forces actors to rely on the moral language of responsibility when trying to generate political will (Beardsworth, 2015, p. 71).
For advocates of the R2P, the doctrine is, despite its limitations, seen as “the best chance in our own time to build an international community that is less tolerant of mass atrocities and more predisposed to preventing them” (Bellamy, 2014, p. 1). The R2P’s call to action is from this perspective a way to influence states to act when their will to do so is lacking. For sceptics, however, the R2P’s reliance on “a highly idealistic belief in the capacity of moral pressure to alter the disposition of the world’s states” (Hehir, 2010, pp. 233-234) is a highly debilitating attribute. The fact that the R2P remains a normative rather than legal principle leaves its application contingent on political will and moral appeals. Ananya Sriram (2020) argues in this issue that the expectations of the R2P have been set too high; in a world that consistently creates and reproduces violence, the R2P goal of eradicating mass atrocities becomes impossible.
The corresponding, yet under researched, notion of a responsibility to prosecute, also a core theme in the Journal, constitutes, in contrast to the R2P, a form of criminal and legal responsibility. Criminal responsibility is connected to the establishment of guilt; “what distinguishes [the perpetrator] from those who are innocent is that he has committed a certain crime. [The perpetrator] is guilty and therefore has to bear the burden of responsibility” (Alweiss, 2003, p. 309). The notion of legal responsibility holds an actor answerable to a legal system (Bukovansky et al., 2012, p. 56). Direct responsibility and accountability within a legal framework are central to international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and their embodiment in the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 1998 Rome Statute, which underpins the Court, codifies the evolving norms of mass atrocity accountability, and enshrines the concept of individual criminal responsibility for these crimes in international law (Mills, 2012, p. 408). In this issue, Aparajitha Narayanan (2020) delves further into the complex nature of international criminal trials and highlights how new technologies and their use in court bring new challenges, as well as possibilities, to the international criminal justice process.
Despite its key role in international criminal law, the ICC is ultimately limited by a similar dependence on political will as the R2P. While the Statute makes clear the responsibilities of signatory states, “those legal expectations exist in a much broader international political milieu that necessarily intrudes on the smooth running of the ICC as a judicial body, especially because it relies on states to carry out its wishes,” which risks that “states’ multiple, overlapping, and competing interests will inevitably lead to conflicts over interpretation and relative weighting of competing interests and norms” (Mills, 2012, p. 407). As Schabas (2011, p. 61) notes, the Rome Statute’s technical and sophisticated legal aspects are “combined with a series of more political propositions that touch the very heart of State concerns with their own sovereignty”. Evan Supple’s (2020) Hegelian analysis of state sovereignty in this issue contributes to the discussion on the controversies surrounding the R2P doctrine and the ICC, and the implications for their operationalisation.
As we are repeatedly reminded by collective inaction over mass atrocities, in addition to climate change, global inequalities, weapons proliferation and pandemics, it is clear that the sovereign state has in no way receded nor lost its relevance (see Taylor, 1994; Murphy, 1996). In many cases, the state remains the ultimate arbiter. In this deadlock of national interest, raised by many of the contributors to this issue, including Valentina Uccioli’s (2020) discussion of R2P’s application in Libya and non-application in Venezuela, as well as Sam Greet’s (2020) analysis of the European Union’s inconsistent and convenience-based application of its R2P, the question of how to proceed persists. One answer is the notion of political responsibility, which deals with responsibility in the context of self-interested states under anarchic conditions.
Political responsibility, unlike other forms of responsibility which rely on voluntarism, sees global challenges best governed through responsible (national) government. The argument goes that global challenges should be governed by the rule-bound duties of state leaders to their citizens, framed in terms of efficacy and legitimacy; efficacy here referring to the ability of a government to meet its citizens’ needs (Beardsworth, 2015, pp. 75-77). This approach recognises that the global issues of concern to us all are impossible to deal with in isolation, but that appeals to moral responsibility are insufficient to generate action unless they converge with national interest. As such, this notion of responsibility embraces states’ natural tendency toward self-interest in the hope that states will make the rational calculation that to act collectively is in their interest.
Despite its potential, however, the notion of political responsibility can be problematic. Its language of national interest and primacy of duty towards its own national community displays a clear “hegemonic geography of care and responsibility” (Massey, 2004, pp. 8-9). While assuming that responsibility for non-citizens and governance of global issues may be the occasional outcome of responsible (national) government under conditions of global interdependence (Beardsworth, 2015, p. 78), it far from follows that states will always pick this path. History demonstrates this. Emily Faux’s (2020) poem in this issue reminds us of past and present failures to act.
How states make their calculations can be illustrated if we think more broadly about issues such as climate change or pandemic responses. There are reasons to believe that sometimes the states least affected by, and/or most capable of independently dealing with challenges of a global nature have the least incentive to ‘cede’ part of their sovereignty (see Beardsworth, 2015) to a higher body. This tendency could be reinforced when their action derives from a political responsibility to their own citizens, rather than a moral responsibility toward humanity. This reflects the realist stance that states only cooperate when it is beneficial for them to do so, and tend to cheat and free-ride when they can (Zartman and Touval, 2010, p. 6). Meanwhile, “the most vulnerable individuals, groups, classes and regions are those most exposed to perturbations, who possess the most limited coping capacity and suffer the most from the impact of a crisis […] and who are endowed with circumscribed potential for recovery” (Bohle, Downing and Watts, 1994, p. 38). Global inequalities and political inclinations thus influence the calculations states make: consider the Group of 77’s statements on climate change (United Nations, 2019) and COVID-19 (G-77, 2020), in contrast to the United States’ continued intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (Pompeo, 2019) and its recent decision to stop its funding to the World Health Organization (Victor and Hauser, 2020).
Neither moral, legal nor political conceptions of responsibility have succeeded to substantially alter the persistence of mass atrocity crimes. While the appeal to national interest may be the surest way of galvanising states into action, highlighting the connection between protecting people (elsewhere) while upholding political responsibilities (at home) is no self-evident step, nor do actions based on self-interest guarantee ‘moral’ outcomes. But if moral responsibility is unenforceable, (international) legal responsibility subject to political whim, and political responsibility swayed by discrepancies in power, where are we left in terms of the notion of responsibility altogether? A more radical alternative might perhaps ask us to look beyond the state altogether in order to circumvent nationally and territorially applied notions of responsibility and care, which Massey (2004, pp. 8-9) argues have been hegemonic especially in the Western world. By emphasising the mutual constitution of the local and global, and hence the relational construction of our identities, Massey (2004, p. 17) challenges us to acknowledge the responsibilities we carry “towards the wider relations on which we depend”, not only in terms of protection from mass atrocities as discussed in this issue, but as a broader responsibility for the reproduction of the structures that enable it.
Assuming responsibility for structures of inequality and oppression, however, would require a paradigm shift along with an enlivened imagination. As the poignant words of Fredric Jameson (1994, cited in Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. ix) remind us: “it seems easier for us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late capitalism; perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations”. This applies beyond the realm of the economy and climate, and reminds us that any substantial change demands not only critique but a critical imagination of alternatives involving policy-oriented research.
Kristin Smette Gulbrandsen, Georgiana Epure and Emma Bapt
Alparone, D. (2020) ‘Realpolitik vs. Human Rights’ Protection: The Rohingya Crisis and The Failure of the Responsibility to Protect’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 16-27.
Alweiss, L. (2003) ‘Collective Guilt and Responsibility Some Reflections’, European Journal of Political Theory, 2(3), pp. 307–318.
Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (2005) ‘Power in global governance’, in Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (eds) Power in Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
Beardsworth, R. (2015) ‘From Moral to Political Responsibility in a Globalized Age’, Ethics & International Affairs,29(1), pp. 71–92.
Bellamy, A. J. (2014) The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bohle, H. G., Downing, T. E. and Watts, M. J. (1994) ‘Climate change and social vulnerability: Toward a sociology and geography of food insecurity’, Global Environmental Change, 4(1), pp. 37–48.
Bukovansky, M., Clark, I., Eckersley, R., Price, R. M., Reus-Smit, C. and Wheeler, N. J. (2012) Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Downs, G. W. and Jones, M. A. (2002) ‘Reputation, Compliance, and International Law’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 31(1), pp. 95–114.
Eddy, M. (2020) ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Counter Terrorism: An Incompatible but Inevitable Interaction’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 28-43.
Erskine, T. (2008) ‘Locating Responsibility: The problem of Moral Agency in International Relations’, in Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 699–707.
Faux, E. (2020) ‘Polished Me Like a Jewel’. Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 139-140.
G-77 (2020) ‘Statement by the G-77 and China in support of the WHO in the fight against COVID-19’. New York, 19thApril 2020. Available from: https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=200419
Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2006) The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It). Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Greet, S. (2020) ‘The European Union and the R2P Norm: A Marriage of Convenience’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 114-138.
Hehir, A. (2010) ‘The Responsibility to Protect: “Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing”?’, International Relations, 24(2), pp. 218–239.
Koh, H. H. (1997) ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, The Yale Law Journal, 106(8), pp. 2599–2659.
Massey, D. (2004) ‘Geographies of responsibility’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 86(1), pp. 5–18.
Mills, K. (2012) ‘Bashir is Dividing Us: Africa and the International Criminal Court’, Human Rights Quarterly, 34(2), pp. 404–447.
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Narayanan, A. (2020) ‘Evidentiary Challenges of New Technologies in International Criminal Trials’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 58-77.
Orford, A. 2011. International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pompeo, M. R. (2019) ‘On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement’. Press statement, U.S. Department of State, 4th November 2019. Available from: https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/
Schabas, W. A. (2011) An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sriram, A. (2020) ‘Not possible in the world that actually exists? Examining the value of the Responsibility to Protect in a world of systemic violence’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 44-57.
Supple, E. (2020) ‘Responsibility to Protect and the Immanent Logic of Freedom: A Hegelian Analysis of Humanitarian Intervention’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 78-91.
Taylor, P. J. (1994). ‘The state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system’, Progress in Human Geography, 18(2), pp. 151–162.
Uccioli, V. (2020) ‘Between realpolitik and humanitarianism: Why is the application of the R2P inconsistent? A closer look at Libya and Venezuela’, Responsibility to Protect Student Journal, 5(1), pp. 92-113.
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Victor, D. and Hauser, C. (2020) ‘What the W.H.O. Does, and How U.S. Funding Cuts Could Affect It’. The New York Times, 15th April 2020. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/health/who-world-health-organization-coronavirus.html
Zartman, W. and Touval, S. (2010) ‘Introduction: return to the theories of cooperation’, in Zartman, W. and Touval, S. (eds) International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–14.
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Atrocity Prevention, 15 Years Since the Adoption of R2P: Interview with UN Special Adviser on R2P Dr. Karen Smith
Interview by Georgiana Epure, Charlotte Abbott and Emma Bapt
In 2005, governments unanimously agreed that they have both an individual and a collective responsibility to protect (R2P) populations, not just citizens, from four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. In 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established the position of the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect and since 2009 the Secretary-General has been publishing annual reports on R2P clarifying and developing what this concept means and what ‘tools’ it needs in order to be implemented more effectively. Fifteen years after the adoption of the R2P, we talked with Dr. Karen Smith, the UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect. Our interview touched on a series of issues that range from how the coronavirus pandemic affects atrocity prevention efforts to the role that religious leaders have in countering incitement to violence, and the relation between R2P and the Women, Peace and Security agenda – the topic of the Secretary-General’s upcoming report on R2P.
Realpolitik vs. Human Rights’ Protection: The Rohingya Crisis and The Failure of the Responsibility to Protect
By Diletta Alparone
After the massacres of Rwanda and Srebrenica, the international community claimed a solemn “Never Again” – never again it will permit such overt human suffering without doing anything to stop it. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was adopted in 2005, as a response to Kofi Annan’s call for justice and humanity. Nevertheless, while R2P presented successful cases like Kenya (2008) and Cote D’Ivoire (2011), the Rohingya case in Myanmar exemplifies the deep inconsistencies of its application. The Rohingya people have been suffering from state-sponsored destruction and a slow-burning genocide, evidencing a form of laissez-passer from the international community. This paper looks at the factors which have led to the international community’s failure to apply the Responsibility to Protect in Myanmar, claiming that the over-dependence on the UNSC consensus, as well as the presence of broader political and economic considerations, have weakened the demand for R2P in Myanmar.
By Macaulay Eddy
The relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and counter terrorism will be critically analysed – arriving at the conclusion that the doctrines are conceptually and practically incompatible. Nonetheless, it will be discovered that their interaction is inevitable and, as this is likely to only increase, their incompatibility should be studied and managed. It is revealed that counter terrorism has the potential to override the Responsibility to Protect and, therefore, it will be argued that they should be maintained as separate doctrines, particularly in light of their continued interaction. To achieve this conclusion, the concepts of state-centricity and impartiality are analysed with respect to this relationship.
Not Possible in the World That Actually Exists? Examining the Value of The Responsibility to Protect in a World of Systemic Violence
By Ananya Sriram
The ongoing proliferation of atrocity crimes has led many to question whether or not the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is ‘possible in the world that actually exists’. This essay argues that expectations for R2P are set too high, and that it cannot possibly hope to eradicate mass violence altogether. This does not necessarily represent a failing of R2P as a norm in itself, but rather, a failing of the liberal market system in which it was created. Mass violence cannot be eradicated because it is systemic, and rooting out the structural causes of this violence is beyond the remit of R2P. This essay will critically analyse Reiff’s statement by examining three key points: a) that R2P exists in a world which systemically creates and reproduces mass violence, and therefore cannot hope to eradicate it, b) that in ‘the world that actually exists’, the national interest will always supersede human rights norms, and, c) whether R2P as a norm is experiencing a ‘backsliding’ from the Global North and Global South alike, as the world order moves away from liberal democracy.
By Aparajitha Narayanan
Modern international criminal justice, and particularly the evolution of digital evidence, owe their exposition to the war crimes trials of World War II. During the time of establishment of such tribunals and their functioning systems, many felt that international criminal law (ICL) did not possess the legal finesse necessary to reprobate the atrocities committed then. While certain crimes were ostensibly considered to be morally wrong by the international community as a whole, legal sanctions against such actions were not entirely present. International criminal law thus had to develop and draw level with the expectations of the world, against the backdrop of the acts of savagery that took place at the time. Contemporary times also dictate that as technology becomes more and more boundary-less, it tends to take crimes in its stride, thereby enhancing their outreach as well. This paper will trace the history of evidence collection in ICL and will highlight the linkage between digital evidence and contemporary times. While delving into specific cases, the paper will elaborate on the present and future use of digital technology in international crimes. It will also deal with the confluence of digital technology and open source evidence. This paper will argue that digital evidence in ICL may be disadvantageous to defence teams, owing to lack of resources, and certain solutions will be discussed to address the above problem. In conclusion, the positive and negative aspects of technology’s influence on ICL will be espoused, while underscoring the need to take a cautious approach.
Responsibility to Protect and the Immanent Logic of Freedom: A Hegelian Analysis of Humanitarian Intervention
By Evan Supple
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was one of the first major gestures made by the international community to ascribe primacy to human rights over sovereign rights. While the version eventually ratified by the UN Member States in 2005 is far less controversial in scope than its initial 2001 theorization, it remains a hotly contested norm. Much of said debate, however, does not directly pertain to R2P but to the international legal constellation in which it is situated. Thus, for a coherent analysis and critique of R2P to emerge, a comprehensive philosophical analysis of both state sovereignty and international relations is necessary. It is the political philosophy of German idealist G.W.F. Hegel that provides the most rigorous dialectical delineation of what form sovereignty and international relations ought to take. This paper begins with an exegesis of Hegelian sovereignty and proceeds to analyze the pillars and foundations of R2P from a Hegelian perspective, ultimately concluding that the programme is largely uncontroversial in itself, but for a just practical deployment, significant renovations to the framework within which it exists are in order.
Between Realpolitik and Humanitarianism: Why Is the Application of the R2P Inconsistent? A Closer Look at Libya and Venezuela
By Valentina Uccioli
This paper critically examines the inconsistent application of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), focusing on the case studies of Libya in 2011 and Venezuela today. The application of R2P requires a ‘manifest failure’ of the state to protect its citizens. However, it is unclear what threshold ‘manifestly failing’ entails. I use Gallagher’s (2014) criteria to show how in both crises, the Libyan and the Venezuelan governments respectively, were ‘manifestly failing’ their responsibility. In light of this, the paper examines the geopolitical interests of the 5 permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia, China) involved in each crisis. The result shows how the lack of particular interests from China and Russia in Libya prevented them from vetoing Resolution 1973 that allowed a NATO coalition to intervene to protect Libyans. However, in Venezuela, the interests of the P5 diverge, preventing the UN Security Council from providing the country with proper relief, despite the evidence of severe human suffering. Further, this paper finds that the intervention in Libya has led to a discrediting of R2P, since, given the controversial outcome of such intervention, R2P has been linked to regime change. This increased political weight has severely reduced the chances that the UNSC will apply R2P in relation to Venezuela.
By Sam Greet
The European Union’s (EU) fulfilment of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) largely follows the logic of ‘marriage of convenience’. The Union’s bureaucracies have been committed – and somewhat successful – champions in developing the norm and its principles since the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and its inclusion in the subsequent UN World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) in 2005. It has demonstrated considerable capacity in its ability to assist in the responsibility to prevent as well as employing more indirect coercive measures as an economic power. Yet, in practice, the disingenuity of its rhetoric shows the EU and its member states only deliver R2P when it is convenient to do so, based on matching pre-existing resource allocation to other normative pursuits or the foreign policy interests of both the EU as a whole and its individual member states. The EU can be seen to demonstrate inconsistent application and illegitimate inaction in delivering its R2P capacity, as well as bringing detriment to the norm’s development when its member states misuse its invocation for their national benefit. Whether in dereliction of its ‘special responsibility’ towards refugees on and beyond its borders, lack of prioritisation of mass atrocity prevention in South Sudan, continued aid support for Myanmar despite ongoing genocide and ethnic cleansing, or its arms sales to Saudi Arabia used to commit war crimes in Yemen, the EU is a hollow R2P advocate. Until the R2P and its principles are genuinely internalised into both EU and member states’ priorities in the international arena, this marriage of convenience is unlikely to change.
Text and photographs by Emily Faux
Two tonnes of human hair are currently on display at the Auschwitz Museum. Hair was shaved from the corpses of prisoners selected for immediate death in the gas chambers and shaved off prisoners selected for labour as soon as they entered the camp. Following Hitler’s efficient, no-waste policies, the hair was gathered into 20 kg bales and sold to German firms to serve various purposes. Some victims' hair was used to make ignition mechanisms in bombs, other’s for ropes, cords and mattress stuffing. This was the fate of one and a half million women, men and children over five years in Auschwitz alone. Inspired by her recent visit to Auschwitz-Birkenau, Emily wrote this poem as a fictional account following a young Polish Jew named Anne, who’s hair was used to manufacture socks after her age and gender rendered her unsuitable for work and sentenced to immediate death.